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Introduction
Peace operations and comprehensive assistance 
missions rely heavily on retaining local consent; one 
critical factor in achieving this is the accountability 
of the mission to the government and people of the 
country in which it serves. Mechanisms for oversight 
and review, and processes for handling local input and 
dissent, may be one way in which an operation can 
enhance accountability. The diffi culty lies in fi nding 
ways to ensure that accountability to local actors is just 
as rigorous as accountability to donors, sponsors and 
contributing countries.
Comprehensive assistance missions
The international community is still experimenting 
with various types of post-conflict peace support 
and stabilisation missions. Comprehensive assistance 
missions – which span both the traditional peace support 
sectors of law and order, and areas more commonly left 
to aid partners, such as good governance and economic 
development – are even more experimental. In our own 
region, the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon 
Islands (RAMSI) is the most prominent example.
On a spectrum of peace operations – with traditional 
armed peacekeepers interposed between formerly 
warring parties at one end of the spectrum, and 
international transitional administrations fi lling the 
vacuum of government at the other end – comprehensive 
assistance missions draw from both ends. On one 
hand, the range of tasks undertaken by comprehensive 
assistance missions is almost as broad as that undertaken 
by an interim administration. On the other hand, like 
a traditional peacekeeping mission, a comprehensive 
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assistance mission works at the invitation of and as a 
partner to an elected government. 
Just as traditional peacekeeping must retain the consent 
of the local people and political leaders, so too must a 
comprehensive assistance mission work on the basis of 
an invitation which could be withdrawn at any time. 
And just as an interim administration must fi nd ways, 
in lieu of an elected government partner, to build 
local ownership of the new post-confl ict environment, 
equally must a comprehensive assistance mission 
concern itself with not undermining or appearing to 
undermine the authority of the host government at 
any stage, while preparing local partners to take back 
full management.
Developing accountable mechanisms for oversight and 
review of the mission that engage and are owned by 
local leaders and the local population is one possible 
way of helping a comprehensive assistance mission to 
build a stronger consent environment at the outset of 
the mission. In addition, processes established early on 
for locals to provide constructive input and for handling 
dissent and disagreement between the operation, the 
government and the people may go some way towards 
averting a destabilisation of the consent environment 
when dissent inevitably arises later on. In short, when 
the local population has a means for registering their 
ideas and their grievances, and feels as though they are 
receiving a fair hearing, they are less likely to pursue 
those grievances through less constructive avenues.
Consent environments
The United Nations Department of Peacekeeping 
guidelines (1995, p.15) state that
[l]egitimacy is the most important asset 
of a peacekeeping operation. It rests on an 
understanding that the operation is just and is 
1  The views of the author are her own and in no way are intended 
to refl ect New Zealand government policy or the views of New 
Zealand’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
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representative of the will of the international 
community as a whole rather than some partial 
interest.
Without external authorisation and endorsement by the 
appropriate bodies an operation would be considered 
illegitimate and possibly illegal under international 
law. However, this defi nition fails to recognise that an 
operation’s legitimacy comes from two sources – external 
authorisation and internal consent within the country 
of operation. Without internal consent an operation 
would be considered an assault on sovereignty and an 
intervention tantamount to an act of aggression against 
the state.
Internal consent – political and popular – forms a 
critical part of the operation’s legitimacy. How to retain 
the agreement of the host government and the local 
population often dominates the minds of those who 
lead and govern peace operations. Without the blessing 
of the government and the grassroots it is impossible for 
the operation to exist, let alone have impact. At the most 
extreme, should a host government withdraw consent, 
an operation is essentially forced to leave. Even in cases 
where the government does not withdraw its consent for 
the operation, but actively undermines the operation, 
it can be made near impossible for the operation to 
achieve its goals. Similarly, where government consent 
exists but the local population does not support the 
operation, it can become the target of attack, forcing it 
to abandon certain functions, and be actively resisted 
by local partners, preventing the mission from achieving 
any sustained change. 
Changes to the internal consent environment are 
common in all peace operations. The tide of support 
falls and rises as the operation moves through various 
phases. This is particularly the case in transitional 
administrations and comprehensive assistance missions. 
The changes experienced by the recipient country can 
be sudden and dramatic, and may be unwanted by the 
less scrupulous in society. Misunderstanding, wilful or 
genuine, of the operation’s intent can also affect levels 
of consent. Criticism and dissent can be disheartening 
for an operation set up with the best of intentions. They 
can be equally threatening to the operation’s existence, 
more so when the criticism comes from quarters of 
infl uence. Since much of the most unsettling criticism 
is made by self-serving dissenters to mask expedient 
objectives, it can be tempting for missions to bypass the 
actual criticisms and move directly to trying to improve 
the consent environment by diplomatic means. There 
can be defi nite value in working that route. At the 
same time, not addressing the actual criticisms can have 
risky consequences. Albeit that much of the criticism 
is made for illegitimate reasons, it is often based on 
some perception of legitimate cause, and there is often 
at least some legitimate criticism too. Leaving those 
grievances unaddressed leaves room for dishonest actors 
to manipulate the situation and create a larger public 
grievance. It also prevents the mission from learning and 
recognising the inevitable mistakes and weaknesses that 
any mission will have.
If an operation can fi nd ways to address criticisms 
before they become major issues of public concern, 
it may be more likely to avoid some of the tidal shifts 
in the consent environment. This will also help to 
prevent self-serving dissenters using public forums to 
raise illegitimate criticisms and misleading the public. 
This is the point at which the operation’s mechanisms 
for accounting to the local population come into play. 
The better equipped an operation is to receive, process 
and respond to suggestions, complaints and grievances 
from the local population, the more likely it is to 
retain its local legitimacy and consent for longer, and 
be effective. 
Downwards accountability
Most local criticism of international assistance and 
peace operations has tended to focus on the perception 
– rightly- or wrongly-based – that the operation wields 
far too much power with too little control by locals. 
Enter the mechanisms of democratic accountability: the 
accounting for one’s actions and decisions to the people 
they affect, and enabling the people to participate in 
decision making and governance. These mechanisms are 
primarily concerned with preventing excess of power.
The Brahimi report on peacekeeping (2000, p.2) 
noted the ‘importance of holding individual offi cials 
at headquarters and in the fi eld accountable for their 
performance’. The techniques for doing so are highly 
underdeveloped in all international operations. Even 
where operations have developed reporting, review 
and complaints mechanisms they have largely been 
disempowered by being kept internal. Performance 
review and oversight is critical to enhancing the 
transparency of international operations. 
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The practice of democratic accountability is important 
to international peace operations for many reasons, not 
least because its manifestations – transparency, checks 
and balances on power, local participation, and local 
ownership of governance – are likely to confer greater 
legitimacy on the operation. There is also a strand of 
thought, with more than a little credibility, that it is 
inconsistent with the intended ends of a peace operation 
for it not to be a bastion of democracy itself.
In a functioning democracy, democratic accountability is 
assured through the processes established to practice that 
democracy (most usually through representative politics 
and elections). Through the practice of participatory 
decision making and representative politics, legitimacy 
for the governing structure in the country derives from 
the people. How to create mechanisms of democratic 
accountability in a comprehensive assistance mission, 
however, is less straightforward. All international 
assistance or administrative missions have struggled to 
fi nd a ‘downwards’ balance to their ultimately ‘upwards’ 
accountability to donors and authorising bodies. The 
struggle is heightened for the comprehensive assistance 
mission, which must constrain itself, as much as possible, to 
working through its government partner, and not appearing 
to establish a parallel system of government. It is also 
integral to the development objectives of a comprehensive 
assistance mission that it model local empowerment and 
ownership by being fully and fi rstly accountable to the 
local partners it is seeking to develop.
Consultation with and involvement of the local 
community is one of the most important means for 
an operation to build local ownership, and identify 
problems and effective solutions. The United Nations 
handbook Multi-Disciplinary Peacekeeping (United 
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 
undated, pp.10-11) notes that:
In its peacekeeping and peace-building efforts, 
the operation is best advised to work through 
existing local authorities and community elders 
and its peace initiatives must be closely tailored 
to indigenous practices of confl ict management, 
provided these do not contradict accepted 
international standards of human rights and 
humanitarian law. 
The question, however, of who in the local community 
a comprehensive assistance mission is to consult, and 
how, does not have an obvious answer. The issue is 
particularly sensitive since any community consultation 
undertaken by the operation must be done without 
being seen as undermining the operation’s partnership 
with the government, or the government’s sovereignty. 
Compounding the problem is the fact that often the 
government in a fragile state does not have well-developed 
mechanisms by which it can itself receive public input and 
monitor public opinion. If an operation was to offer the 
community accessible methods for participation it may 
attract the sort of input that should be more appropriately 
addressed to the government. 
Rather than creating a centralised – and therefore 
more seemingly ‘parallel’ – system of democratic 
accountability, an operation can institute a range of 
processes for ensuring that local critique can be received 
and replied to. Through local consultation, input and 
feedback – using mechanisms such as involvement 
of locals in implementation planning, internal and 
transparent mission investigatory processes, a mission 
ombudsman, and a stronger governance role by the 
authorising body – a comprehensive assistance mission 
may fi nd many means for enhancing its accountability 
and thereby its legitimacy and credibility.
Involvement in operation and imple-
mentation planning
One of the sources of local criticism of comprehensive 
assistance missions is that those in charge of managing 
the operation do not understand the local environment, 
yet are in sole charge of deciding what should be 
implemented, when and how.
One way of gaining a greater degree of local ownership 
in a peace operation is to consult over the appointment 
of the operation’s key managers. Rather than having 
the authorising body alone appoint a head of mission, 
some form of consultation and agreement with the 
host government over such high-level appointments 
would get better buy in and local support. This has 
been used before – in the United Nations Transitional 
Administration in Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) the head 
of the mission, the special representative of the secretary-
general, was appointed in consultation between the two 
parties (Serbia and Croatia) and the Security Council.
Another method is the creation of joint administrative 
structures responsible for implementing aspects of the 
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operation’s mandate. In Kosovo this was done by way of the 
Joint Interim Administrative Structure (JIAS), which was 
given policy guidance by an Interim Administrative Council 
made up of four United Nations Interim Administration 
Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) representatives and four local 
people. The JIAS had the power to make recommendations 
to the special representative, who could either accept 
the recommendations or otherwise had to explain the 
reasons for not accepting them. In East Timor, prior to 
the formation of the fi rst government, a Transitional 
Administrative Council, consisting of four representatives 
from the United Nations Transitional Administration 
in East Timor (UNTAET) and four local personnel, 
gave policy guidance to the East Timor Transitional 
Administration. In UNTAES in Eastern Slavonia, the head 
of the operation, the transitional administrator, established 
a Transitional Council consisting of one representative 
each from the government and three local population 
groups (Croat, Serb and minorities). It was advisory only, 
and the transitional administrator was not required to 
obtain consent for decisions, in order not to risk being 
held captive to vetoes. UNTAES also established 13 Joint 
Implementation Committees consisting of Serb and Croat 
representatives, covering a range of sectoral issues such as 
the refugee return, health and education. 
The value of each of these models is the high-level 
engagement by locals in the direction and management 
of the operation. Each model is workable for a 
comprehensive assistance mission.
Oversight of operation personnel by 
internal mission processes
A second, and not insignifi cant, source of criticism are 
the actions of mission personnel. It has now been well 
documented in every peace operation globally that 
peacekeepers and their civilian comrades have been 
involved in illegal, immoral and insensitive activity. 
Peacekeepers have, unfortunately, been involved in 
prostitution, smuggling, slavery and even murder. This 
immediately detracts from the credibility of an operation. 
But even when an individual’s actions are of less obvious 
malevolence the operation can be brought into serious 
disrepute. Relationships between expatriates and locals 
that are dishonest or go sour, cultural insensitivity such 
as heavy drinking, inappropriate clothing and unsafe 
driving, all are lightning rods for criticism from the 
local population. While most missions do their best 
– some better than others – to stamp out and control 
such behaviour, it is almost inevitable that such activity 
will be engaged in by a few.
When the actions of a few disrupt the good name of an 
operation, it is more likely that it will face challenges 
to the immunity of its personnel. A local community 
needs to see that, just as is the case for them in their 
own justice system, wrong behaviour is investigated, 
judged and punished.
While the military forces have generally well-developed 
processes for investigating reports of such activity, there 
is almost no equivalent for the civilians in a mission. 
With civilians now numbering many more than military 
personnel, particularly in a comprehensive assistance 
mission, this exposes a glaring gap in the accountability 
of an operation. Even where an operation does have 
some form of internal investigatory and censure process 
for individuals found to be bringing the operation into 
disrepute, this is usually closed off to locals, internal and 
anything but transparent.
Comprehensive assistance missions could greatly benefi t 
from having an accessible complaints and investigatory 
mechanism within the operation for handling complaints 
about such activity. In order to be properly accountable, 
such a process would require formal hearings, powers 
of investigation, and the authority to make binding 
judgements, including repatriation of individuals for 
prosecution in their home territory and the waiving 
of immunity for an individual who has acted illegally 
during his/her free time. Decisions could then be 
reported to the local community. Rather than the 
operation appearing to be less credible because of 
the actions of a few ‘bad eggs’, it would develop an 
accountability chain that made it very clear to the local 
population that the operation would not tolerate any 
kind of misbehaviour by its personnel. Its legitimacy 
and credibility are likely to be improved.
While all operations routinely require immunity from 
the domestic law in the host country for personnel in 
order to take place, this immunity is not absolute in that 
it can be waived by the Head of the Mission concerned. 
It is also not intended to confer complete immunity from 
any legal system, but only from the host country.  It is 
premised on the false assumption, that there will always 
be some legal system which would have jurisdiction. 
In regard to lifting immunity in the country of the 
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actual peace operation, this would only be done if the 
host country’s legal system was considered appropriate 
to be able to deal with the allegations concerned.  In 
virtually all circumstances, that is unlikely. The real 
problem is therefore that the legal processes somewhere 
else, which should in theory ‘stand behind’ immunity 
from the law in the country of operation, either do not 
confer extra-territorial jurisdiction, or there are major 
practical diffi culties of ever making it work (such as 
gathering evidence) (Ladley, 2005). 
So, at least some practical and visible accountability 
(by waiver in some cases, and by external prosecution 
in others) needs to be clear to the local population if 
this critical element of accountability is to be believed. 
Ensuring that operation personnel do not have impunity 
from all law (i.e., that contributing countries have the 
ability to extend extra-territorial jurisdiction over all 
members of its assistance mission) is very important.  At 
the moment, very few countries have the legal provisions 
to do so.  If an individual is repatriated and tried in their 
home country for a criminal offence in the country of 
operation, the results of such trials and hearings need 
to be fed back to the local community. 
Oversight by a jointly-directed om-
budsman’s offi ce
In addition to internal mission processes, a more 
independent process for investigating complaints would 
also help improve accountability. In a comprehensive 
assistance mission – where the operation works 
in partnership with the host government – such 
a mechanism, jointly headed by an independent 
government appointee and an independent appointee 
appointed by the authorising body, could also 
contribute towards building local capacity and political 
responsibility and ownership. The mechanism could 
operate in a similar way to an ombudsman’s offi ce 
– accepting broader complaints relating to operation 
policy, or to individuals where the complainant was 
not satisfi ed with the outcome of the internal mission 
investigatory process.
The establishment of independent ombudsman’s offi ces, 
mandated to address concerns with a peace operation, is 
becoming more common and has been recommended 
by the United Nations secretary-general, in a report on 
the protection of civilians in armed confl ict. Described 
by one researcher, Frederick Rawski (2002, p.116):
Partly in response to growing concerns about 
abuses by UN staff and the lack of transparency 
of UN fi eld missions generally, Ombudsperson 
offi ces have been the main vehicle established at 
the mission level to resolve claims of abuse. … In 
theory these institutions ensure that the mission 
as a whole acts in a way that is consistent with its 
mandate, and with international human rights 
standards generally.
Ombudsman’s offi ces have been established during a 
number of operations, including in Bosnia, Kosovo and 
East Timor. Each one has had differing mandates. The 
Bosnian ombudsman was restricted to examining the 
actions of local civil administration institutions only, 
and could not address the actions of the international 
operation. In Kosovo, the ombudsman’s office is 
able to address all activities and processes (local and 
international) except for the NATO-led civilian policing 
component of the operation, KFOR. In East Timoro 
the ombudsman was authorised to address action by 
any international or local institution.
The most openly available information relates to the 
Kosovo ombudsman’s offi ce. The Kosovo ombudman’s 
offi ce was established to: 
promote and protect the rights and freedoms 
of individuals and legal entities and ensure 
that all persons in Kosovo are able to exercise 
effectively the human rights and fundamental 
freedoms safeguarded by international human 
rights standards, in particular the European 
Convention on Human Rights and its Protocols 
and the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights. (Ombudsperson Institution in 
Kosovo, 2004) 
Proving the local appetite for such mechanisms, in the 
year July 2003–June 2004, 4,000 people contacted the 
Kosovo ombudsman and 420 cases were provisionally 
registered. The ombudsman in Kosovo has also written a 
range of reports on wider issues, including the division of 
powers in UNMIK and the legality of total immunity for 
UNMIK personnel. The publicly available reports from 
the Kosovo ombudsman provide a real insight into the 
types of concerns and issues facing the local population, 
greatly enhancing the transparency of the operation.
Something similar – a Joint Steering Committee – was 
established as part of Australia’s original Enhanced 
V
ol
um
e 
3,
 N
um
be
r 
2 
20
07
19
Cooperation Program (ECP) in Papua New Guinea. 
The Joint Steering Committee of the ECP consisted 
of representatives from both Australia and Papua New 
Guinea. It provided an oversight mechanism that could 
respond to local petitions and complaints by allowing 
that ‘[a]ny member of the Joint Steering Committee 
may put in writing any complaint regarding the conduct 
of a Designated or Related Person and regarding 
implementation of Article 8 [relating to jurisdiction].’1 
That complaint then became the subject of consultation 
between Papua New Guinea and Australia through the 
Joint Steering Committee.
Whichever means is used, providing a dedicated and 
independent mechanism by which the local population, 
at any time, can register serious complaints about the 
activities or processes of the operation would markedly 
improve the democratic accountability and transparency 
of any mission. 
Oversight by the operation’s 
authorising body
The oversight of an operation is one of the fi rst things 
decided when the international community considers 
how best to establish a peace mission of any kind. 
Ultimately, every peace operation is overseen by the 
body or organisation which authorises the mission – be 
it the United Nations or a regional body such as NATO 
or the Pacifi c Islands Forum (as in RAMSI’s case). 
Some bodies are better experienced than others in 
overseeing peace operations. The United Nations, for 
example, oversees multiple peace operations which 
must report to the Security Council periodically as 
determined by the operation’s mandate. Reporting 
to the UN Security Council is supposed to allow an 
opportunity for review and guidance of the operation. 
In doing so, the Security Council has at its side the 
UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, which 
continuously studies best practice and lessons learnt 
from each operation. Other bodies, particularly some 
regional bodies, are less experienced.
The way in which an operation is overseen is vitally 
important to how it operates. Strong governance will 
help the mission to stay on task and prevent any gradual 
‘mission creep’. Ultimately, the oversight body is the 
fi nal arbiter of changes to and withdrawal of a mission. 
Currently it is usual, however, that the oversight body 
is only in receipt of reporting from the mission itself. 
While a host government may make representations to 
that oversight body, there is little ability or process for 
the authorising body to receive regular reporting from 
the host government and local population.
The level and quality of oversight of peace operations 
(even by the UN Security Council) has occasionally 
given rise to suggestions that the UN’s now inoperative 
Trusteeship Council be revived. The Trusteeship 
Council, a modern equivalent, or a replication of its 
powers in a committee of a regional body required to 
oversee a peace operation, may assist in more thorough 
oversight of such operations.
The UN Trusteeship Council had three primary 
responsibilities: to consider reports from the administering 
power; to accept petitions from inhabitants; and to 
provide for periodic visits to the region under trusteeship. 
In addition, the Trusteeship Council was empowered 
to formulate questionnaires on the political, economic, 
social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of 
the trust territory. These questionnaires, reports, petitions 
and visits would form the basis of an annual report to the 
General Assembly regarding the trusteeship. 
Adoption of the functions of the Trusteeship Council by 
a standing committee of an operation’s overseeing body 
would better ensure that those who oversee operations 
are able to receive reporting from the operation and 
make changes, hear from the people of the country, 
including the host government, and undertake their 
own research. This combination of oversight functions 
immediately provides some balance of operation 
accountability to its masters with accountability to 
the local people and government. The avenue of local 
petition direct to the oversight body would clearly be one 
of last resort – lest the oversight body be inundated with 
spurious or self-serving appeals. But should legitimate 
and high-level differences of opinion arise, particularly 
between the host government and the peace operation, 
the oversight body would be well placed and qualifi ed 
to act as an interlocutor.
1 Article 9(5), Joint Agreement on Enhanced Cooperation between 
Australia and Papua New Guinea, 30 June 2004 (entry into force: 
13 August 2004).
V
ol
um
e 
3,
 N
um
be
r 
2 
20
07
20
Conclusion
With the addition of the sorts of tried and tested 
oversight and investigatory mechanisms discussed 
above – a fully empowered oversight committee in the 
authorising body, a jointly-staffed ombudsman’s offi ce, 
an investigatory and complaints mechanism within 
the operation, and joint implementation/management 
consultative committees – a comprehensive assistance 
mission would have many more processes for addressing 
issues of dissent. Should a consent environment start to 
destabilise, any and all of those mechanisms should be 
able to appropriately address the concerns and prevent 
a larger public grievance from forming and unsettling 
the operation’s consent environment.
Comprehensive assistance missions have been shown 
to be valuable instruments of change in post-confl ict 
environments; with their ‘whole of government’ approach, 
they are able to provide a coordinated approach to security 
and development. To remain credible and supported they 
must show that they are willing to accept input, feedback 
and critique from the local population. This paper has 
examined but a few of the potential mechanisms for 
improving the downwards accountability of a mission. 
Others that could be explored include performance 
reviews that relate an operation’s mandate directly to the 
individual performance assessments of operation personnel, 
jointly developed and managed exit strategies, and fl exible 
approaches to operation structures that can better take 
account of local input. Rather than shutting off the avenues 
of critique – leaving public media the main vehicle – an 
operation which is truly accountable to the people will 
offer simple processes for hearing the people’s voices, and 
will demonstrate an honest willingness to respond even 
when it means self-censure, admitting fault and making 
changes. Regrettably, it has been shown that by not having 
such avenues, even the most supported operation faces 
unwarranted and disproportionate condemnation.
References
Brahimi, L. (2000) Report of the Panel on United Nations 
Peace Operations [Brahimi Report], A/55/305–S/2000/809, 
presented to the United Nations General Assembly and 
Security Council, 55th session, 21 August 
Caplan, R. (2004) ‘Partner or Patron? International 
civil administration and local capacity-building’, 
International Peacekeeping, 11 (2), Summer
Caplan, R. (2005) ‘Who Guards the Guardians? 
International accountability in Bosnia’, International 
Peacekeeping, 12 (3), Autumn, pp.463-76
Chesterman, S. (2003) You, the People: the United 
Nations, transitional administration, and state-building. 
Project on transitional administrations – fi nal report, 
International Peace Academy
Ladley, A. (2005) ‘Peacekeeper Abuse, Immunity and 
Impunity: The Need for Effective Criminal and Civil 
Accountability on International Peace Operations’, 
Politics and Ethics Review, 1(1), pp. 81-90
Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo (2004) Fourth Annual 
Report 2003–2004 addressed to the special representative of 
the secretary-general of the United Nations
Rawski, F. (2002) ‘To waive or not to waive: immunity 
and accountability in UN peacekeeping operations’, 
Connecticut Journal of International Law, 18, pp.103-32
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(undated), Multi-Disciplinary Peacekeeping: Lessons from 
Recent UN Experience
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(1995) General Guidelines For Peacekeeping Operations, 
New York
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 
(2003) Handbook on United Nations Multidimensional 
Peacekeeping Operations, New York, December
United Nations Secretary-General (1999) Report of the 
Secretary-General to the Security Council on the protection 
of civilians in armed confl ict, S/1999/957
Rebecca Lineham works as a foreign 
policy offi cer at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and Trade.  She 
is currently posted in Honiara, 
Solomon Islands.  After leaving 
Amnesty International she undertook 
a Master of Strategic Studies at 
Victoria University of Wellington’s 
School of Government, focusing on 
peacekeeping, confl ict resolution and 
terrorism. In 2006 she was awarded 
the inaugural Prime Minister’s Prize in 
Strategic Studies, and also the Holmes 
Prize for her research.  
V
ol
um
e 
3,
 N
um
be
r 
2 
20
07
21
BEING ACCOUNTABLE: Voluntary 
Organisations, Government 
Agencies and Contracted Social 
Services in New Zealand
An Institute of Policy Studies publication by 
Jo Cribb
Governments in New Zealand and many other 
countries rely heavily on voluntary (or non-profi t) 
organisations to deliver vital social services. 
However, the current contracting and funding 
mechanisms used to purchase such services on 
behalf of citizens are problematic for both funding 
bodies and providers.
Being Accountable: Voluntary Organisations, 
Government Agencies and Contracted Social 
Services in New Zealand explores the contracting 
relationship from the perspective of voluntary 
organisations. The central issue, it is argued, does 
not lie in the use of contracts per se, but in the 
relationships and practices used to generate them. 
Published – November 2006
Format – A5 Paperback, pp 195
ISBN – 1-877347-15-9
Price – $25.00 (including P&P within New Zealand)
To have a copy of Being Accountable: Voluntary 
Organisations, Government Agencies and Contracted 
Social Services in New Zealand and an invoice sent to 
you, please email, phone, fax or mail your order to:
Institute of Policy Studies
Victoria University of Wellington
Email ipos@vuw.ac.nz
Telephone +64 4 463 5307
Fax +64 4 463 7413
PO Box 600, Wellington
New Zealand
IMPLICATIONS OF POPULATION 
AGEING: Opportunities and Risks
An Institute of Policy Studies publication 
edited by Jonathan Boston and Judith A. 
Davey 
Population ageing, both globally and in New 
Zealand, is often seen in negative terms.  But it 
can also be viewed positively – as an opportunity, 
an achievement of human civilisation and thus 
something to celebrate.  The contributors to the 
14 chapters in Implications of Population Ageing: 
Opportunities and Risks explore New Zealand’s 
changing demography and examine many of 
the policy implications of population ageing, 
including those impinging on fi scal management, 
income support and the labour market.
The crucial message is that while population 
ageing undoubtedly poses serious challenges, 
it also generates many opportunities and 
possibilities, and the recognition of these will be 
critical for New Zealand’s long-term economic 
and social success.
Published – October 2006
Format – B5 Paperback, pp 388
ISBN – 1-877347-14-0
Price - $39.90 (incl P&P within NZ)
To have a copy of Implications of Population Ageing: 
Opportunities and Risks and an invoice sent to you, 
please email, phone, fax or mail your order to
Institute of Policy Studies
Victoria University of Wellington
Email ipos@vuw.ac.nz
Telephone +64 4 463 5307
Fax +64 4 463 7413
PO Box 600, Wellington
New Zealand
